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DGKD: Distributed Group Key Distribution with Authentication Capability 
Pratima Adusumilli, Xukai 
Abstract- Group key management (GKM} is the most impor- 
tant issue in  secure group communication (SCC). The existing GKM 
protocols fall rnto three typical classes: centralized group key distri- 
bution (CGKD), decentralized group k e y  management (DGKM), and 
distributed/contributory group key agreement (CGKA). Serious p r o b -  
l ems  remains in these protocols, as they require existence of central 
trusted entrties (such as group controller or subgroup controllers), 
relayrng of messages (by subgroup controllers), or s t ~ c t  member syn- 
chronization (JOT multiple round stepwise key agreement), thus suf- 
fering from the single point of failure and attack, perfonnance bot- 
tleneck, or  misoperations in the situation of transmission delay or 
network failure. In thrs paper, we propose a new class of GKM pro- 
tocols: distnbuted group key distribution (DGKD).  The new DGKD 
protocol solves the above problems and surpasses the ezisting G K M  
protocols Z R  terms of simplicity, eficien.cy, scalabdity, and robust- 
ness. 
Keywords: Secure Group Communicatian, Group Key 
Management, Centralized Key Distribution, (Distributed) 
Contributory Key Agreement, Distributed Key Distribu- 
tion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Secure group communications (SGC) over networks (e.g, 
the Internet} refers to a setting in which a group of mem- 
bers can send messages to and receive messages from group 
members, in a way that outsiders are unable to  glean any 
information even when they are able to intercept the mes- 
sages. SGC is an inseparable component of cyber security. 
Broad critical applications such as collaborative work, tele- 
conferencing/medicine, multi-partner military action, and 
cyher forensics in critical fields depend on SGC for their 
security. 
The most important problem facing SGC is group key 
management (GKM). The primary difficulty for GKM 
comes from member dynamics. How to design robust, 
scatabIe, efficient GKM protocols supporting high dynam- 
ics is the focus of all SGC researches. Many GKM prc- 
tocols have appeared in the literature and typically fall 
into three categories: centralized group key distribution 
(CGKD), decentralized group key management with re- 
laying (DGKM), and (distributed) contributory group key 
agreement (CGKA). 
there is a central trusted authority (called group controller 
~n CGKD schemes PI, PI, 131, PI, 151, 161, 171, PIl PI1 
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(GC)) that js responsible for generating and distributing 
the group key. Whenever a new member joins or an exist- 
ing member leaves, the GC generates a new group key and 
distributes the new key to the group. The problems with 
the centralized schemes are the central point of failure, per- 
formance bottleneck, non-scalability, and the requirement 
of trustworthiness of the group controller by all members. 
In DGKM schemes [IO], 1111, [12], (131, the group is di- 
vided into multiple distinct subgroups and every subgroup 
has a subgroup controller (SC) responsible for key man- 
agement for its subgroup. In addition, an SC has the key 
of its parental subgroup. When an SC receives a message 
from one subgroup, it decrypts the message, encrypts the 
message with the key of the other subgroup and sends to 
the other subgroup, i.e., relaying the message. The prob- 
lems with DGKM are that SCs can still be considered as 
central and trusted entities (at a smaller scale) and the 
messages undergo multiple relaying before they reach the 
entire group. Relaying of every data message puts huge 
burden on SCs. In CGKA schemes [14], [14], 1151, [16], [17], 
[18], the group key is generated/agreed up by uniform con- 
tributions from all group members. These kind of schemes 
assume equality and uniform work load among group mem- 
bers. They are generally executed in multiple rounds and 
require strict synchronization. The CGKA protocols are 
primarily different variations of the n-party Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement/exchange 1141, [IS], [19], [20], [17], [18]. The 
main problem with using this key exchange mechanism is 
that  the group members need synchronization to iteratively 
form parental keys from their two children’s keys. Once one 
member is slow or one rekeying packet is delayed, the key 
agreement process will be postponed or even misoperates. 
Moreover, there are dependances among nodes’ keys (i.e., 
a blinded node key is dependent on the secret node key and 
a parental key on its two child’s keys). This dependance 
results in the breaking of all ancestral keys once one key is 
compromised. 
To overcome the above problems we propose a new class 
of GKM protocols: called distributed group key distribu- 
tion (DGKD). The DGKD protocol does not assume any 
trusted and more powerful third party but allows the equal- 
ity of capability, responsibility, and trustiness among all 
group members. The protocol organizes the members in a 
tree structure and performs any rekeying operation in just 
two rounds, which do not need to be strictly synchronized. 
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The new protocol also allows strong yct simple authentica- 
tion. In addition, DGKD has the following advantages: (1) 
one kcy (not two keys) per node; (2) iridependance of nodes’ 
keys; (3) robust against transmission delay, network failure 
or compromise of node keys. All these properties make the 
new protocol simple, robust, efficient and scalable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
I1 briefly describes the related work in the area of SGC. 
We propose the new protocol in Section I11 and the issues 
of performance and security are discussed in Section IV. 
Finally we conclude the paper in Section V. 
11. RELATED WORK 
Extensive rcsearch has been conducted on GKM and a 
considcrable number of protocots have been developed 1211, 
1221, 1231, 1241, 1251, 1261, 1271, 1281, wit 1141, 131, 1301, 1311~ 
1151, 1101, 1321, 1331, 141, 151, [ W ,  1341, [351, 1361, 1371, 1381, 
1121, 171, 1391, 1401, 1411, 1171, [1811 1421, 1431, 1441, 191, 1451, 
each with different properties and performance. 
SGC applications can typically be divided into broad- 
cast/muIticost communication, i.e., one sender and mul- 
tiple receivers, or o n e - t o - m a n y  communication and group 
(or many-to-many) communication, i.e., every sender also 
being a receiver. Some G K M  schemes 1211, 1461, [15], l l O ] ,  
1111, 1131 arc suitable for broadcast applications, some other 
schemes 1281, [14], [15], 1161, 1411, 1171, [I81 for many-to- 
many applications, arid there are also some schemes [3], 
[12], [7], [9] suitable for both kinds of apptications. Based 
on how the group key is fornicd and distributed, the GKM 
protocols are classified as CGKD, DGKM, and CGKA. 
Based on the kind of cryptosystem used, the schemes for 
SGC can be divided into publ ic -key  based schemes 1461, 
IllJ, [13] and secret-key based schemes. Based on the kind 
of seci i r i ty ,  the SGC schcmes may be classified as uncon- 
ditionally secure or computationally secure 1471, 1431. Fur- 
thermore some schemes may resist against any number of 
colluding adversaries, whereas others 1221, 1231, 124, [25], 
1261, [27], 1321, 1431 only resist against the collusion of up 
to certain number of adversaries. For a comprehensive sur- 
vey of state-of-art techniques and challenging problems in 
the area of SGC, readers are referred to the book “secure 
group communications over data networks”, which is pub- 
lished by Springer 1481. 
Among all the GKM protocols, the tree based GKM 
schenie (with various variants) [l], [2], [3], [49], [19], IS], 
[7], 1411, 181, [9], [50], 1511 is the most typical approach. 
The schenie is simple, efficient, scalable, and casy to im- 
plenicnt. The sdienie can be used for both one-to-many 
multicast cornrtiunication ;as well as many-to-many group 
cornmunication. Moreover the tree hascd GKM schcme has 
versions of both CGKD and CCKR. 
111. DlSTRI3UTED GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION 
(DGKD): A NEW CLASS OF GKM PROTOCOLS 
A .  Princ ip le  and assumption 
There are some assumptions in existing schemes. In 
CGKD/DGKM, a secure channel is assumed to exist be- 
tween the GC/SC and each of the potential group mem- 
bers/subgroup members. This secure channel is gener- 
ally implemented by public key cryptosystems. In CGKA, 
which is typically based Diffte-Hellman key exchange which 
suffers from the Man-in-the-Middle attack, it is assumed 
that each group member is equipped with some authenti- 
cation capability which is also implemented by public key 
cryptosystems. SimiIarly, DGKD assumes that every group 
member has a publicly known (unforgeable) public key. 
The new DGKD protocol adopts a tree structure and uti- 
lizes three basic mechanisms to implement distributed key 
generation and distribution: 1) the leaf key of a node is 
the public key of the corresponding group member and all 
the intermediate nodes’ keys are secret keys, 2)  the spon- 
sor of a joining or leaving member initiates the key gen- 
eration and rekeying process and sends the new keys to 
co-distributors (i,e., the first round), 3) the co-distributors 
then help distribute the new keys to  group members in a 
distributed/parallel manner (i.e., the second round). 
All group members have the same capability and are 
equally trusted. Also, they have equal responsibility, i.e. 
any group member could be a potential sponsor of other 
members or a co-distributor (depending on the relative lu 
cations of the member and the joining/leaving members 
in the tree). Thus there is no dependance on a single en- 
tity and even i f  a sponsor node fails a new sponsor for the 
joining/leaving member is chosen by other members. This 
improves the robustness of the protocol. 
B. Sponsor 
A sponsor is a member and the sponsor of a subtree is 
defined as the member hosted on the rightmost leaf in the 
subtree (note: “rightmost” can be equally replaced with 
“leftmost”). Every node has an associated sponsor field as 
shown in Figure 1. 
The sponsor field at a particular node is updated when 
it is along the joining or leaving member’s path. We show 
the joining algorithm for updating the sponsor field in Fig- 
ures 2. 
When a member joins, the sponsor field along the joining 
members path is updated from bottom to the root. If the 
new members id is greater than the sponsor id of the node 
then update the sponsor id with the new member’s id. This 
is continued until the root (See Figure 3) .  
When m7 joins, the sponsor field along its path is up- 
dated. The sponsor id of the node k6--7 is lesser than the 
id of m7, so it is updated to  111. Similarly the sponsor id’s 
of nodes k4-7 and k0-7 are updated to 111. Whenever the 
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Fig. 1. A tree showing sponsor for each node. 
Every member 
.iterate over all the nodes along the joining 
members path from leaf to the root 
. if the joining members id is greater than the 
sponsor id for that  node 
sponsor id joining members id 
.continue 
. else 
.break 
New Mcmbcr 
Fig. 3. Updating the sponsor field when a member joins 
Sid= 110 
Fig. 2. Sponsor update: Join 
Fig. 4. Updating a sponsor field when a member leaves. 
sponsor id for a node is greater than the joining members 
id then the check can be stopped. 
When a member leaves, every member checks along the 
path of the leaving member to  update the sponsor field. If 
a node has the leaving member as the sponsor then they 
update the sponsor field with the sponsor id/member id of 
the other child if exists. This continues upto the root (See 
Figure 4). 
When m7 leaves, the sponsor field along its path is up- 
dated. Since the leaving member is the sponsor all along 
its path, the sponsor field has to be updated by checking 
for the new sponsor for all the nodes. m6 becomes the new 
sponsor for node ks--7. For node k4--7 the member ids of 
both its children are compared and the greater becomes 
the new sponsor, in this case m6. This continues until the 
root. 
C. Co-distributors 
When a sponsor changes the keys along the path, i t  needs 
to distribute them. The sponsor has to distribute the keys 
to all the members whose keys have been changed. But 
it does not know the keys along the other paths to dis- 
tribute the new keys. So, a cc-distributor is required to dis- 
tribute them. The cedistributor is the sponsor of a node 
on another path whose key is not known to the original 
sponsor. The sponsor encrypts the changed key with the 
co-distributors public key and broadcasts this information. 
Thus, the co-distributor helps the sponsor in distributing 
the changed common keys along the other paths. 
D. Initial group key generation and distribution Protocol 
Suppose n members ml ,  ......, mrr decide to form a group. 
They build a virtual key tree and selects a sponsor to de- 
cide an order in which they join the tree. Every member 
updates the key tree by adding members in the key tree 
based on that order and they update the sponsor field in 
all the intermediate nodes. Then every member checks if  it 
is responsible for generating any keys along its path. If so, 
it generates them and distributes the keys either directly 
or with the help of co-distributors. When two sponsors are 
responsible for generating the same key then the rightmost 
among them generates it. As more members join the key 
tree the sponsors and the height of the key tree increase. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, 7727, 7715, m3 and ml are re- 
sponsible for generating the keys. m7 generates all the keys 
( k6-7, k 4 - 7  and k0-7 ) along its path to the root. Then it 
encrypts as follows and broadcasts: {k6-71 k4-7,  k 0 - - 7 } ~ k ~ ,  
and { k D - - 7 , k 4 - 7 } p k s .  m5 will decrypt k0-7 and k4--7 and 
encrypt it as Ik0-7, k4-7}k4--5 where k ~ +  is generated by 
m5 and sent to m 4 .  Similarly keys are generated by m3 
in the left subtree along its path and the root key which 
is generated by the rightmost sponsor m7 is sent to the 
co-distributor of the left subtree m3 as follows. { I c 0 - 7 } ~ 1 ; ~  
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Fig. 5. Initial key generation Example 
is broadcast and m3 will decrypt kO-y and encrypts it as 
{ k ~ - 7 } k ~ - ~  and broadcasts it. Thus every member has the 
newly generated keys along its path. Only two rounds 
are required for this protocol, one round for generating 
keys and distributing along the path and another for co- 
distributors to distribute them. 
E. Join protocol 
Step 1: New member broadcasts request for join 
Step 2: Every meniber 
. mn+l (PKn+l) - =. ml ,->mrl 
. updates the key tree by adding a new member node 
. Find sponsor for joining member: 
. jf sibling present, sponsor = sibling 
. else sponsor = m,+l 
. update the sponsor field along the path of the joining 
member to the root if required 
. generates new secret keys along the joining members path 
and distribute them to co-distributors and to other memberr 
directly by encrypting with common key and broadcasting 
I encrypt the key sent by the joining members sponsor with 
appropriate key and broadcast 
Step 3: If joining member’s sponsor is itself 
Step 4: If cc-distributor is itself 
I I 
Fig. 6. Join Protocol. 
Suppose there are TZ members in the group ml, ,....., m,. 
A new member m,+l makes a join request by broadcasting 
its public key PK. The rightmost member in the key tree 
authenticates the new member, decides the insertion loca- 
tion for the new member and broadcasts this information 
to other members. Additionally the rightmost member also 
sends the virtual key tree and list of public keys of other 
members to the new member. All other members update 
the key tree by adding a new member node in the specified 
location. Then every member checks to see if it is the spon- 
sor of the joining member. If the new member has a sibling 
it becomes the sponsor and generates new keys along the 
path.. If there is no sibling then the joining member itself 
becomes the sponsor and generates the new keys along its 
path and distributes them. Members update the sponsor 
field appropriately i f  required. Figure 6 describes the join 
protocol and Figure 7 shows the protocol operation when 
a new member joins. 
Co-Cisrbu/..\, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Fig. 7. A new member joins (becomes ms), m4 is sponsor and m3 
and m7 are cedistributors. 
When a new member joins, m7 determines the posi- 
tion(i.e., ms) and places the member there. m7 broad- 
cwts the position of the new member to other members. 
All members also determine that m4 is the sponsor of m5. 
So m4 initiates the rekeying process as follows: 1) gener- 
ates new keys k;-51 and k;l-7. 2) after determining 
the cedistributors m3 and “7, encrypts as follows and 
broadcasts: {ki-7r k & - 7 } p k 7 ,  and { k h - 7 } p k 3 ,  3) .  m3 will 
decrypt k;l-7 and encrypt it as {kh-7}ko-a and m7 will de- 
crypt k:--7 and kAm7 and encrypt them as { k i - 7 } k 6 - ,  and 
{kb-7}k4-7r 4) .  m4 also encrypts and sends the keys to m5 
as { k i - 5 ,  k i - , ,  k h - 7 } p k 6 .  As a result, all the members will 
get the new keys. 
When a new member joins, only the keys along its path 
to the root have to be changed and distributed, which can 
be achieved in two rounds with atmost logzn keys being 
changed. 
F. Leave protocol 
0-7803-9290-6/05/$20.00 02005 IEEE. 28 9 
Step 1: Every member 
updates the key tree by removing the leaving member node 
. updates the sponsor field appropriately along the leaving 
members path if required 
. determines the sponsor for changing keys along the leaving 
members path 
. generates new secret keys along the path and distributes 
them to co-distributors and directly to other members 
. broadcasts the key sent by the leaving members sponsor by 
encrypting it with the appropriate key 
Step 2: If sponsor of the leaving member is itself 
Step 3: If cc-distributor is itself 
L 
Fig. 8. Leave Protocol. 
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Assume that member ml leaves the group. Every mem- 
ber updates the key tree by deleting node ml and updates 
the sponsor field along the path if required. Then they 
determine the sponsor who generates new keys along the 
leaving members path and distributes them. If the leav- 
ing member does not have a sibling then the first sponsor 
along the leaving members path becomes responsible for 
changing the keys along the leaving member’s path (See 
Figure 8). 
5 
._’ 
Sponsor 
Fig. 9. A member mg leaves. 
As shown in Figure 9, when a member m5 leaves, all the 
members will remove the node and determine that m4 is 
the sponsor of m5. So m4 initiates the rekeying process as 
follows: 1) generates new keys kk--5, k i m r ,  and kb-,. 2) af- 
ter determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as 
follows and broadcasts: and { k ; J - T } p k 3 ,  3).  
m3 will decrypt kb-7 and encrypt it as {k ; ) -7 }ko-3  and m7 
will decrypt kkT7 and khP7 and encrypt them as {ki-7}ks-7 
and {kb--7}k4-7, 4) .  As a result, all the members will get 
the new keys. 
When a memher leaves only the keys along its path to 
the root have to be changed and distributed, which can 
be achieved in two rounds with a t  most lognn keys being 
changed. 
U. Multzple jo in  protocol 
Suppose m new members join, they make a join request 
by broadcasting their public keys. The rightmost member 
i n  the key tree authenticates the new members, decides the 
locations for all the new members such that minimal num- 
her of keys are changed and broadcasts this information 
to other existing group members. The rightmost member 
also sends the virtual key tree and existing members public 
keys to the joining members. Every member upon receiv- 
ing this message updates its key tree by adding m new 
nodes in the determined positions. In order to perform 
niultiple joins in one aggregate operation, it is required to  
find the common keys shared by the joining members in an 
efficient way. To achieve that we use an already proposed 
scheme, an efficient and scalable key tree based dynamic 
Step 1: Every member 
. updates key tree by adding new member nodes 
. updates the sponsor field along all the paths of the 
joining members 
. computes the keys that need to be changed 
. determines the sponsors who are responsible for changing 
these keys 
Step 2: If sponsor for one of the joining members is itself 
. changes the secret keys dong the joining members path 
and distributes them to co-distributors and directly 
to other members 
. if same key has to be changed, check if right sponsor is itse 
. if rightmost sponsor, change the key and distribute 
. broadcasts the key sent by the joining members sponsor by 
encrypting it with the appropriate key 
Step 3: If co-distributor is itself 
Fig. 10. Multiple Join Protocol. 
conferencing scheme called KTDC in [52] which uses an ef- 
ficient algorithm for computing the shared keys. There will 
be multiple sponsors responsible for changing the necessary 
keys. But here the shared keys which both sponsors have in 
common and which need to be changed will be changed by 
the rightmost sponsor among the sponsors (See Figure 10). 
Fig. 11. New members mo, ml,  m4 and mg join. 
As shown in Figure 11, when new members join, m 7  will 
determine the available positions (Le., ma, ml, m4, m5) 
and place the members there. m7 broadcasts this infor- 
mation to other group members. Ail members also know 
that m5 is the sponsor of m4 and ml is the sponsor of 
mo. They also know that m3 and m7 are responsible for 
sending the key tree structure and the public key list to 
the joining members. m5 initiates the rekeying process as 
follows: 1) generates new keys k&-,, and khm7. 2)  af- 
ter determining the co-distributors m3 and m7, encrypts as 
follows and broadcasts: { k i - 7 ,  I C ; ] - 7 } p k 7 ,  and {kh--T}pk3, 3 ) .  
m3 will decrypt kbP7 and encrypt it as { k h - - 7 } k ; - 3  and m7 
will decrypt ki.-7 and kb-7 and encrypt them as { k i - 7 } k s - 7  
and { k & - 7 ) k 4 - 7 ,  4). m5 also encrypts and sends the keys to 
m4 as { k i p s ,  k i - 7 ,  kh--l}pkd. Similarly ml regenerates the 
0-7803-9290-6/051$20.00 02005 IEEE. 290 
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keys along its path except for the root key which should be 
changed by the rightmost sponsor 7125. Both m1 and m5 do 
these operations in parallel. As a result, all the members 
whose keys have been changed will get the new keys, 
Since all the operations are done in parallel, rekeying can 
be achieved in two rounds by all the sponsors. 
When a network event causes all the previously occurred 
partitions to reconnect this is called a merge. Mctge is 
similar to multiple join and this can also be achieved in 
two rounds which is better than that in TGDH. 
If. Multiple leave protocol 
Step 1: Every member 
. updates the key tree by removing all leaving member nodes 
. updates the sponsor field along all the leaving members 
paths if required 
. determines the sponsors responsible for changing the keys 
along the paths 
Step 2: If sponsor for one of the leaving member is itself 
. generates new secret keys and drstributes them to 
co-distributors and other members directly 
. if same key has t o  be changed, check if right sponsor is itse 
. i f  rightmost sponsor, change the key and distribute 
Step 3: If c-distributor is itself 
broadcasts the  key sent by the leaving members sponsor by 
encrypting it with the common key 
Fig. 12 Multiple Leave Protocol 
When multiple members leave, every member updates its 
key tree by deleting those member nodes and the sponsor 
fields along all the paths. Then they determine the  keys 
that need to he changed and thc sponsors responsible for 
changing those keys. There will he multiple sponsors and 
each sponsor regenerates the keys and distributes them. 
If two sponsors are responsible for changing the same key 
then the rightmost among the sponsors will change the key 
(See Figure 12). 
,. 
I .  I I  
r .  
Fig. 13. hlernbers mo> ml,  m4 and ms leave 
As shown in Figure 13, when several rnenibers mo, ml, 
m4 and m5 leave, every member updates its key tree by 
0-7803-9290-6~05/$20.00 02005 IEEE. 29 
deleting those member nodes. Every member also deter- 
mines that 1713 and m7 are the sponsors. 7717 initiates the 
rekeying process as follows: 1) generates new keys 
and kh-7. 2 )  encrypts the new keys as follows and broad- 
casts: {ki.-7j k t ) - 7 } k s - , ,  and { k h - 7 } p k 3 ,  3) m3 will decrypt 
kL-7 and encrypt it as { k ; ) - 7 } k ~ - - 3  and broadcasts it. Simi- 
larly 7713 generates the keys k& and encrypts it with k2-3 
and broadcasts it. Both m3 and m.7 do these operations 
in parallel. As a result, all the members whose keys have 
been changed will get the new keys. 
In case of a network failure which causes disconnectivity, 
the group gets split and this partition can be dealt with as 
a multiple leave operation. Thus, even for network parti- 
tion the protocol requires only two rounds for regenerating 
and distributing the keys. This is a great improvement 
compared to TGDH which requires several rounds. 
I .  Authentication in DGKD 
Most CGKA protocols do not contain an authentica- 
tion component. Furthermore, the authenticated CGKA 
protocols [53], [54], [55 ] ,  [56], (571 are non-scalable and/or 
non-dynamic. In contrast, the new DGKD protocol is not 
only scalable and dynamic but also able to provide easy 
and strong authentication. Consider two scenarios: (1) the 
sponsor m4 transmits a new key kh-7 to a cedistributor 
m3. (2) m3 transmits the key kt)-i to members m0,ml,m2 
who are in the responsibility scope of m3. In the first case, 
m4 signs the key kh-,(using mq’s private key), encrypts 
both kb-7 and the signed kb-,(using m3’s public key pka) ,  
and sends the result to 7723. 7723 after receiving the message, 
decrypts k;l-7 and then verifies m4’s signature. In the sec- 
ond case, m3 signs k;-,(by its private key), encrypts both 
kt)-i and the signed kkp7(using koP3 which covers mo to 
m3). Then each of the members from mo to m2 can verify 
m3’s signature. 
IV. DISCUSSIONS 
We discuss the performance and security of our protocol 
in this section and analyze the communication and compu- 
tation costs for join, leave, multiple join and multiple leave 
operations. Tree based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [19], 
j34J is one of the most typical CGKA protocols in terms 
of efficiency and scalability, so we focus on the coniparison 
between DGKD and TGDH. 
Key generation is independent, i.e., only the sponsor is 
involved, thus there is no need for synchronization with 
other members which is required in TGDH. In this sense, 
DGKD is more resilient to network congestion, delay and 
failure than TGDH. DGKD also has strong yet simple au- 
thentication. I t  is also collusion free because the new keys 
are independent of the old keys and no matter how many 
members collude they cannot get the keys. Thus, i t  is 
unconditionally secure. Both TGDH and DGKD require 
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two rounds for single join and leave operations. As for 
multiple join and leaving operations, DGKD requires two 
rounds but TGDH requires log(p)  rounds where p is the 
number of members involved. DGKD uses public key en- 
cryption for sending the keys to co-distributors and secret 
key encryption for further distribution of keys (from the co- 
distributors to the members). TGDH requires performing 
modular exponentiations which is in the same complexity 
as the public key encryption. In summary, DGKD is com- 
parable and in some cases better than TGDH in terms of 
communication and computation costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We proposed a new class of GKM protocols for SGC with 
strong yet simple authentication capability. The proposed 
protocol solves some serious problems in the existing prc- 
tocols and is simple, robust, efficient, and scalable. The 
future work is to implement and test the new protocol. 
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